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Summary
On June 23rd, 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) held an EU-Referendum which resulted in 
a vote in favor of withdrawing from the European Union (EU). However, in a post-ref-
erendum reality, several constitutional issues have become apparent. On one hand, it is 
not certain whether the Prime Minister, under the royal prerogatives, can trigger Art. 
50 of the EU Treaty. On the other hand, the scope of Westminster’s approval must still 
be determined. It is believed that the judiciary will end up in a constitutional crisis, es-
pecially the Supreme Court. At the very least, the suspension of ‘Brexit’ procedures is 
causing uncertainty on both sides i.e. UK and EU. This paper will pose some of the es-
sential questions being discussed on the eve of the Supreme Court’s decision over ‘Brex-
it’ in December of 2016/January of 2017.
1 Author is an assistant in the Chair of Administrative Procedure of Faculty of Law and 
Administration Jagiellonian University in Cracow. E-mail: jakub.firlus@uj.edu.pl.
2 Author is an assistant in the Chair of Comparative Constitutional Law of Faculty of Law 
and Administration Jagiellonian University in Cracow. E-mail: natalie.fox@uj.edu.pl.
3 The following paper was written before the Supreme Court of United Kingdom had reached 
its final verdict related to discussed issues. Per data released on the official website, the first 
hearing is scheduled for December 5 2016: https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/supreme-
court-prepares-for-article-50-appeal.html, (12.12.2016).
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Streszczenie
Dalsze rozważania na temat ‘Brexitu’
W referendum przeprowadzonym 23 czerwca 2016 r. Brytyjczycy opowiedzieli się 
za opuszczeniem instytucjonalnych struktur Unii Europejskiej. Jakkolwiek w nieodległym 
czasie okazało się, że podjęta decyzja skutkować będzie szeregiem wątpliwości o konstytu-
cyjnej proweniencji. Z jednej strony, zastrzeżenia związane są z zakresem kompetenc-
ji premiera. Spór prawny odnosi się do oceny dopuszczalności samodzielnej notyfikacji 
instytucjom europejskim zamiaru wyjścia z UE (art. 50 Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej). 
Z drugiej strony, ewentualny zakres zgody parlamentu nie jest jasny i wymaga dalszej 
analizy. Stąd też nieocenioną rolę w tonizowaniu sporu kompetencyjno-konstytucyjnego 
w Zjednoczonym Królestwie przypisać należy sądownictwu. Dalsze wstrzymanie proce-
dury opuszczenia UE jest, bowiem niekorzystne tak dla Zjednoczonego Królestwa, jak 
również dla UE. Stąd też w niniejszym artykule dokonano przeglądu pytań i wątpliwoś-
ci, które wymagają uwagi w przededniu wyroku Sądu Najwyższego w sprawie Brexitu.
*
I.
Beyond a doubt ‘Brexit’ can be described in many different manners, some 
of them are connected to merely political, legal and macroeconomic analyses 
of further relations between the United Kingdom (UK) and EU-27; howev-
er, listed planes somehow seem to interfere with each other. In fact, the econ-
omy4 is said to be a crucial factor that would determine to a great extent the 
eventual shape of British substantive law, in the case when considering the 
matter of subsequent participation by the UK in a Single Market economy 
(‘hard’/’soft’ ‘Brexit’ issue)5. Henceforth it is unknown whether there is a legal 
basis for the further preferential participation in the European Economic Area 
4 See S. Dhingra, G. Ottaviano, T. Sampson, J.V. Reenen, The consequences of Brexit for UK 
trade and living standards, London 2016.
5 See e.g. Brexit and Beyond. How the United Kingdom might leave the European Union a report 
by The UK in a Changing Europe for Political Studies Association of the UK, p. 4 http://ukandeu.
ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Brexit-and-Beyond-how-the-UK-might-leave-the-EU.
pdf (12.12.2016); R. Ladrech, Explainer: what’s the difference between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Brexit?, 
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(EEA) by a non-Member State of the European Union (EU)6. Furthermore, 
this issue arose from potential supervision over the British market, meaning 
it is plausible that EU institutions7 would prefer to keep its competences in 
the field of financial and competition law. UK authorities will be obliged, ac-
cording to international obligations, to maintain8 to some extent direct ef-
fectiveness of EU law regarding domestic systems. In turn the post-referen-
dum legal reality would be affected by EU regulations, directives and other 
European fontis iuris9.
On the other hand, ‘Brexit’ explicitly reflects on British constitutional law 
and EU law as a part of the British legal system. One could state that the de-
cisions made by the British on the 23rd of June, 2016, during the EU-Referen-
dum created serious consequences for both European and domestic law, espe-
cially in terms of human rights and institutional guarantees over substantial 
areas such as: consumer protection law, environmental law, agricultural and 
fishery regulations and judicial cooperation. In an academic paper it is im-
possible to list or discuss each and every legal reflection of ‘Brexit’. Hence, 
only some of these concerns and issues will be analyzed. Simplified research 
shows that British ordo iuris will be divided and uncertainty is to be the op-
timal term of description for the present situation.
To focus on selected constitutional and competency aspects of ‘Brexit’, the 
scope of considerations must be narrowed. For this reason, the issues of the ref-
erendum have been excluded. In fact, it is unnecessary to discuss the issue of civ-
il engagement in the UK since there are numerous available publications dealing 
“The Conversation” (6 October 2016), https://theconversation.com/explainer-whats-the-
difference-between-hard-and-soft-brexit-66524, (12.12.2016).
6 See ‘Smart Brexit’, British Influence (28 November 2016) http://influencegroup.org.uk/
smartbrexit/(12.12.2016); A. Asthana, J. Rankin, ‘Brexit: UK government faces legal challenge 
over single market, “Guardian” (28 November 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/poli-
tics/2016/nov/28/uk-government-faces-legal-challenge-over-single-market?CMP=Share_iO-
SApp_Other, (12.12.2016).
7 See D. Chalmers, Article 50 – five big legal questions, “The UK in a Changing Europe” (4 
November 2016), http://ukandeu.ac.uk/article-50-five-big-legal-questions/, (12.12.2016).
8 Obviously de lege lata EU law involve direct effect on British legal system esp. on condi-
tions set by European Communities Act (1972); see e.g. A. Gillespie, The English Legal System, 
Oxford 2015, pp. 129–130.
9 See e.g. L. Eaker, The Brexit Legal Mess – Falling Into a Black Hole?, “Jurist” (29 June 2016), 
http://www.jurist.org/forum/2016/06/larry-eaker-black-hole.php, (12.12.2016).
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with this subject. Although two factors connected with the EU-Referendum are 
relevant for further consideration. These are the advisory character10 of the refer-
endum and the doctrine of Parliament sovereignty. It is widely accepted that aside 
from its non-binding character, the referendum affects the role of Parliament in 
the British legal system11. Thus, it is not acceptable12 from a political point of view 
to repeal the popular (democratic) vote by Parliament13. On the other hand, recog-
nition of direct effectiveness of EU law in British domestic system constrain a su-
premacy of Parliament. Therefore, neither referendum nor supremacy of European 
law14 fulfills the orthodox doctrine of parliament’s sovereignty15. When consider-
ing the purely theoretical16 aspects of the commented doctrine, subsequent leg-
islation passed by Parliament may ignore17 the British decision made on the 23rd 
of June, 201618. After all, a constitutional and competency crisis, which is occur-
ring in the UK now, could lead to a full ‘resurrection’ of Parliament sovereignty19.
10 See V. Miller and A. Land, Brexit: how does the Article 50 process work?, House of Commons 
Library, 30 June 2016, pp. 10, http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/
Summary/CBP-7551 (12.12.2016); Brexit and Beyond..., pp. 5.
11 See P. Mikuli, N. Fox, Instytucja referendum z Zjednoczonym Królestwie Wielkiej Brytanii 
i Irlandii Północnej – uwagi wokół ogólnokrajowego referendum z dnia 23 czerwca r., [In:] Aktu-
alne problemy referendum, eds. B. Tokaj, A. Feja-Paszkiewicz, B. Banaszak, Warszawa 2016, 
s. 291–292; P. Mikuli, Zasada podziału władz w ustroju brytyjskim, Warszawa 2006, p. 62.
12 See P. Craig, Brexit: A drama in Six Acts, p. 33, http://law.indiana.edu/what/advance-knowl-
edge/vibrant-community/assets/craig-brexit.pdf (12.12.2016).
13 See R. Ekins, The Legitimacy of the Brexit Referendum, U.K. Const. L. Blog (29th Jun 2016) 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/06/29/richard-ekins-the-legitimacy-of-the-brexit-ref-
erendum/(12.12.2016).
14 See e.g. A. Gillespie, The English..., p. 133–134; I. Loveland, Britain and Europe, [In:] The 
British Constitution in the Twentieth Century, ed. V. Bogdanor, Oxford 2003, pp. 676–678.
15 As H. Thompson stated: ‘[a]s EU membership was always hard to reconcile with the con-
stitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty without putting that membership to the test 
of exit’; see H. Thompson, Haven’t we been here before?, “The UK in a Changing Europe” (28 
November 2016), http://ukandeu.ac.uk/havent-we-been-here-before/(12.12.2016).
16 See R. Gordon QC, Constitutional Change and Parliamentary Sovereignty – the Impossible 
Dialectic, [In:] The British Constitution. Continuity and Change. A festschrift for Vernon Bogdanor, 
ed. M. Qvortrup, Bloomsbury 2015, pp. 153–154.
17 See opp. P. Mikuli, Zasada podziału..., p. 60.
18 See Brexit and Beyond..., p. 5.
19 Political statements made by some of the MPs show that the outcome of potential voting over 
‘Brexit’ issue in Parliament is unclear; see e.g. C. Lucas, Why I will vote against triggering article 
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II.
The process of the UK withdrawing from the UE is complex and could 
lead to a constitutional crisis in terms of institutional and competency un-
certainty, meaning there are several doubts and questions connected with the 
personal competence to trigger the notification under Art. 50 of the Treaty20. 
The ‘Brexit’ process is the most complicated case by default and by the rea-
son of characteristic. At this point the main factor is that the so-called ‘Brex-
it’ is composed of several individual stages21. Therefore, research on the state’s 
withdrawal from the EU must be divided into the four following time-stages:
 – Internal decision made by the Member State over withdrawal from EU 
(pre-notification, domestic stage).
 – Formal initiation of the withdrawal process by triggering Art. 50 of 
the Treaty.
 – Bilateral (Member State – UE authorities) negotiations22 over the terms 
of the withdrawal.
 – Post-treaty modifications of domestic law.
At this moment the UK is considering the first step, without any prop-
er solution for moving forward, yet to some extent the lack of clarity of Art. 
50 has further complicated the withdrawal process. The wording of follow-
ing provisions suggest that there are two separate and autonomous factors of 
withdrawal proceedings stated. Article 50 sets up the right to withdraw from 
the EU, however, the Treaty provisions are rather simplified, outlining that 
pre-notification proceedings were to be grounded by domestic law23, reiterat-
ing that it is a matter of domestic legislation to determine whether there is suf-
ficient reason for the initiation of the process governed by Art. 50 of the Trea-
ty. It is a matter of internal constitutional law of the Member State to set out 
50, “Guardian” (27 November 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/
nov/27/vote-against-triggering-article-50-brexit-reckless (12.12.2016).
20 Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, C 202/13.
21 See E. Suwara, ‘Wyzwania prawno-proceduralne dla Unii Europejskiej związane z BRE-
XIT-em’, ‘Europejski Przegląd Sądowy’ 2016, nr 9, pp. 11.
22 See A. Łazowski, ‘How to withdraw from the European Union. Confronting hard reality’, 
CEPS Commentary (16 January 2013), pp. 2 https://www.ceps.eu/publications/how-with-
draw-european-union-confronting-hard-reality; ‘Brexit and Beyond’..., pp. 7.
23 ‘in accordance with its [Member State] own constitutional requirements.’.
60 PRZEGLĄD PRAWA KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 2017/1
conditions which must be fulfilled before a formal process may occur (stage 
no. 2), justifying the binding referendum, Parliamentary control or judicial 
review. There are several doubts in accordance with the literal interpretation 
of Art. 50, some of which on the grounds of the admissibility of accepting 
the will of the Member State to withdraw from the EU, which is an uncondi-
tional24 character of notification25. It is sufficient issue to determine wheth-
er one’s submitted notification under Art. 50 of the Treaty could have been 
withdrawn. Unless the procedure of ‘Brexit’ is ultimate, one could set differ-
ent arguments over the scope of governmental competencies, specifically royal 
prerogatives, to operate in relation with the EU institutions in this field. How-
ever, issues centering around the Treaty’s interpretation are held by a Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJUE)26, in fact the interpretation at this 
point does not fulfill the acte clair doctrine27, therefore, raising doubts in the 
proceedings before British courts over the meaning of EU law should be re-
ferred28 to the CJUE. Obviously, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
is not likely to bring the interpretation matter to the European jurisdiction, 
especially in the case of ‘Brexit’. Finally, further interpretation of the Treaty is 
irrelevant to the UK’s ‘constitutional requirements’ as mentioned in Art. 50.
Aside from the aforementioned issues listed above, there are several con-
stitutional uncertainties arising from ‘Brexit’. At the pre-notification stage, 
it is crucial to determine whether the competence to trigger the Art. 50 does 
encompass the scope of royal prerogatives. In other words, is it acceptable, in 
terms of constitutional law that the Prime Minister, without previous West-
24 High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division Divisional Court, case Gina Miller & Deir 
Tozetti Dos Santos v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, stated that the result of 
giving notice under Article 50 is unenviably and it will cause the complete withdrawal from EU.
25 See P. Craig, ‘Brexit’..., pp 28; ‘Brexit: how does’..., pp. 15–16. However, research on 
pre-referendum negotiation between UK and EU shows that from EU institutional point of 
view ‘Brexit’ seems to be irreversible; see e.g. J. Barcz, ‘Unia Europejska a Wielka Brytania – 
prawne aspekty porozumienia nakierowanego na zapobiegnięcie Brexitowi’, Europejski 
Przegląd Sądowy 2016 (4).
26 See A. Gillespie, The English..., pp. 137–139.
27 See e.g. Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 15 September 2005 Intermodal Trans-
ports BV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën, C-495/03, Curia.
28 See about status of UK’s judges in face of European law order M. Arden, An English Judge in 
Europe, [In:] M. Arden, Human Rights and European Law: Building New Legal Orders, Published 
to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2015, DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198728573.001.0001.
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minster approval, could formally initiate the ‘Brexit’ process (stage no 2)? 
Due to academic research and judicial decisions there are several29 answers 
at this point, some stating that government is entitled to give notice of with-
drawal without any prior parliamentary decision30 since prerogative to con-
duct foreign affairs is exercised solely by government, and primarily by the 
Prime Minister under untrammeled prerogative powers31.
Nevertheless, this argumentation is key considering the following reasons. 
Firstly, if it is accepted that foreign affairs and transactions between the inde-
pendent states are royal prerogatives32, this proves to be the case unless the ex-
ercised powers affect the plane of domestic law33. Due to the abovementioned 
direct effectiveness of EU law the formal initiation of the withdrawal process 
has a significant impact34 on domestic law, especially regarding human rights. 
Furthermore, the government will operate in the field of prior statutory regu-
lation (ECA), in fact, those arguments were crucial in the Gina Miller & Deir 
Tozetti Dos Santos v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union case35.
Secondly, the scope of prerogative powers can be altered by a constitution-
al convention or legal constraints such as statutory approval36, thus British 
29 P. Craig argued that there are three different models considering this issue; see P. Craig, 
‘Brexit’..., p. 29.
30 See V. Miller, A. Lang, ‘Brexit’..., pp. 11–12; Gina Miller & Deir Tozetti Dos Santos v. Sec-
retary of State [76]. See also D. Chalmers who stated that considering the human right issue 
lead us to the conclusion that approval and activity of Parliament is required after withdrawal 
notification is given by Parliament; D. Chalmers, op.cit.
31 This approach does fulfill with Blackstone’s doctrine of prerogative powers; see about 
the distinction between Blackstone and Dicey’s sight on royal prerogatives L. Maer, O. Gay, 
The Royal Prerogative, House of Commons Library, (30 December 2009), p. 3 http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpolcon/784/78403.htm (12.12.2016).
32 See I. Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and Human Rights. A Critical In-
troduction, Oxford 2015, p. 93; P. Leyland, The Constitution of the United Kingdom. A Contextual 
Analysis, Bloomsbury 2016, p. 87; A.W. Bradley, K.D. Ewing, Constitutional And Administrative 
Law, Pearson 2003, p. 309.
33 See about two planes of international agreements A. Gillespie, The English..., pp. 94–95.
34 See about distinction between international relations and EU membership J. Hunt, A rul-
ing in Belfast make the high court’s Brexit decision even more complicated than you think, “The 
Conversation” (4 November 2016), https://theconversation.com/a-ruling-in-belfast-makes-
the-high-courts-brexit-decision-even-more-complicated-than-you-think-68247 (12.12.2016).
35 Detailed analysis of this case is set in further research.
36 P. Craig, ‘Brexit ’..., pp. 30–31.
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constitutional law creates37 a mechanism of control over the scope and exer-
cise of prerogatives38 both political and legal. Legal aspects relate to the ac-
ceptance of judicial review over governmental activity39 and in this case, acts 
made by courts are protecting the power of Parliament40. The political41 con-
trol, on the other hand, relates to previous approval of Parliament in govern-
ment actions42. Due to the importance of conducted matters it is necessary 
to set out authorization in statutes by the Parliament.
These considerations lead to the contrary approach where triggering, under 
the royal prerogative, Art. 50 of the Treaty without prior parliamentary control 
and approval is inadmissible. The arguments based on the Parliament’s sover-
eignty doctrine43 and relevant impact of EU law on the British legal system set 
a pre-triggering legal condition, which is the acceptance of the decision of ‘Brex-
it’ by the Parliament. Enacting statutes empowering the government would also 
determine the time factors of the process44, meaning that British ‘constitution-
al requirements’ in the first stage are divided between Parliament and govern-
37 See about British and American experiences on the judiciary control over the executive 
actions A. Glendon, A. Schubert Jr., Judicial Review of Royal Proclamations and Order-in-Council, 
“The University of Toronto Law Journal” 1951, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 70.
38 See about legal control of prerogatives T. Poole, United Kingdom: The royal prerogativ, 
“International Journal of Constitutional Law” 2010, No. 8, p. 148, http://icon.oxfordjournals.
org/content/8/1/146.extract (12.12.2016).
39 See I. Loveland, Constitutional Law..., p. 94. However British constitutional law recogniz-
es difference between judicial review on existence of prerogative power and its use; see esp. 
CCSU v Minister for Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374. One could state that appropriate use of 
prerogative powers (executive actions) does not fulfill with scope of judicial review.
40 See S. Fredman, The Least Dangerous Branch: Whose Role is it to Protect Parliamentary 
Sovereignty? Miller and the Human Rights Implications of ‘Brexit’, “Oxford Human Right Hub” 
(7 November 2016), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/the-least-dangerous-branch-whose-role-is-it-
to-protect-parliamentary-sovereignty-miller-and-the-human-rights-implications-of-brexit/
(12.12.2016).
41 Parliamentary approval generally, on the field of foreign affairs, is not needed before 
government action, yet ministers are responsible to Parliament for their decisions; see A.W. 
Bradley, K.D. Ewing, Constitutional..., p. 309.
42 See I. Loveland, Constitutional Law..., p. 94.
43 See P. Mikuli, N. Fox, op.cit., p. 291.
44 See N. Baber, T. Hickman, J. King, Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable 
Role, I-CONnect (28 June 2016), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/06/pulling-the-arti-
cle-50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role/(12.12.2016).
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ment competencies. However, government is solely exercising the will of British 
people and their mandate in legislature and until Westminster passes the prop-
er legislation, the Prime Minister unable to enact such change, prima facie, ful-
filling the royal prerogative. Relevant arguments in favor of this approach were 
set by the Court in Gina Miller & Deir Tozetti Dos Santos v. Secretary of State. 
It is worthwhile to point out two of them, which can be found as controversial:
 – Since the withdrawal process is inevitable it will directly affect the 
domestic legal system45.
 – Exercise of government’s prerogative may lead to nullification of human 
rights set up by EU law46.
The first of the listed arguments is partially correct, it refers to per se ob-
vious conclusions considering the effects of withdrawal on the British legal 
system, since Art. 50 of the Treaty is ‘the only way’47 to leave the EU, the ef-
fects of government’s subsequent conduct are evident. Henceforth the the-
oretical outcome of the proceedings set by the Lisbon Treaty and repealing 
ECA are equal48 in terms of domestic law. However, this thesis is rather sim-
plified because the repealing of the ECA and bypassing the Treaty procedure 
would per se violate the UK international obligations49 and as such is unac-
ceptable. Nevertheless, it is coherent with doctrine of Parliament suprema-
cy in the British constitutional system50. Unduly the Parliament has exclusive 
power to determine the time-period and extent of the EU law transposition 
into the domestic legal system. Court judgment and argumentation related 
to the inevitability of the ‘Brexit’ process is to some extend a priori, as afore-
mentioned, an unconditional factor of notice given under Art. 50, is not cer-
tain and it is purely a matter of EU law, therefore, the Court should not have 
laid down its decision on such justifications.
We believe that sufficient arguments in favor of the Parliament’s competence 
on the ‘Brexit’ case arise from two constitutional issues; supremacy of Parlia-
45 See [11]–[14].
46 See [37], [43], [57]-[66].
47 See e.g. V. Miller, A. Lang, ‘Brexit ’..., pp. 7–9.
48 See to some degree opt. P. Craig, ‘Brexit ’..., pp. 32–33.
49 See e.g. A. Gillespie, The English..., pp. 133–134.
50 See e.g. A.L. Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights, Portland 2009, 
pp. 162 ff.
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ment and statutory alteration of the scope of royal prerogatives. The second of 
the listed issues was also taken into consideration by the Court and is so justified 
in the court’s final decision which argued that in fact the royal prerogative is ex-
cluded since the same legal field already operates within the statute51. In regards 
to the second argument the supremacy of Parliament obviously has its limits. 
Nonetheless since the ECA came into force, within its prospective effects, Par-
liament by its own decision constrained the supremacy rule, hence the decision 
over regaining limitless legislation power should also be made by Parliament52.
Regarding the court argumentation on interfering between human rights set 
up by EU law and bringing the notification under Art. 50 of the Treaty one could 
say that it is misleading in several aspects. Primarily the essential elements53 of 
human rights in the UK was set up in the Human Rights Act54 yet the Treaty 
and subsequent legislation grounded in additional, so called EU citizens’ rights, 
is in direct participation in the European Parliament and the main issue at this 
point is to determine whether merely triggering Art. 50 will affect those rights. 
Some stated that the EU is rooted in human rights derived from the ECA, not 
the European law itself and consequently, if the ECA is not repealed the rights 
will be exercised and guaranteed by the UK’s authorities55; the recognition of 
such EU rights, as statutory law, is challenged by some commentators56. What 
is in common with these two approaches? Both arguments refer purely to the 
post-treaty modifications (stage no 4) rather than to the withdrawal process it-
self. Therefore, as long as the UK remains a Member State of the EU, the rights 
set up by the European legislation will stay unchanged, which is to say that the 
51 See Gina Miller & Deir Tozetti Dos Santos v. Secretary of State [77 ff]; Also, about mentioned 
seizure of royal prerogatives see e.g. I. Loveland, Constitutional..., pp. 101–101.
52 See similar argumentation on this issue by N. Baber, T. Hickman, J. King, op.cit.
53 See A. Zięba, Brytyjska koncepcja praw i wolności obywatelskich w dobie reformy ustroju pań-
stwa, [In:] Ustroje, tradycje i porównania. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana prof. dr hab. Marianowi 
Grzybowskiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin, eds. P. Mikuli, A. Kulig, J. Karp, G. Kuca, 
Warszawa 2015, p. 352; R. Costigan, P.A. Thomas, The Human Rights Act: A View From Below, 
“Journal of Law and Society” 2005, Vol. 32, No 1, p. 51: “The Human Right Act was described 
as having ‘the potential of being one of the most fundamental constitutional enactments since 
the Bill of Rights over 300 ago”; A. Gallespie, op.cit., pp. 42–46, 172.
54 Human Rights Act 1998 (9 November 1998).
55 See similar argumentation D. Chalmers, op.cit.
56 See E. Bjorge, EU Rights as British Rights, “Oxford Human Rights Hub” (14 November 
2016), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/eu-rights-as-british-rights/(12.12.2016).
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scope of future citizens’ rights would be subject to negotiations (stage no 3) and 
future treaties. So it is a matter of Parliamentary legislation in terms of repeal-
ing the ECA and adopting new provisions, for example, the Great Repeal Bill.
Aside from the recognition of Parliament’s competency another question 
may be posed. Since the ‘Brexit ladder’ has been expanded, further consider-
ations must be given. Authorization for government actions fulfill only pre-no-
tification requirements, yet it is not clear what legal impact would be given. It 
is a matter of both British constitutional law and EU law whether the act en-
acted by Westminster is binding for the government (both in stage no. 2 and 
no. 3)57. Not only is this the case in the formal initiation of the withdrawal pro-
cess (stage no. 2), yet also in the merits of future agreements between the UE-27 
and the UK, especially whether Parliament could determine an approval statute 
for the issue of future participation in a Single Market (EEA, ‘hard’/’soft’ ‘Brex-
it’). One could say that considering an open formula of negations58, the poten-
tial outcome of it is unpredictable, henceforth further provisions related to the 
merits and wordings of future treaties are solely political and irrelevant. Beyond 
any doubt, the role of Parliament would be crucial to the closure of negotia-
tions59and the future treaty must be established in Westminster before it is rat-
ified60 therefore it is Parliament61 which will determine whether the negotiated 
deal is coherent with previous conditions and indications given in approval of 
such an act, thus Parliament may refuse to ratify the new agreement on future 
relations between the UK and the EU in a post-‘Brexit’ reality; finally howev-
er legally non-binding, the ‘Brexit approval legislation’ will affect the outcome 
of the negotiations between the UK and the EU on the terms of withdrawal.
III.
British constitutional law in the face of ‘Brexit’ is in a constitutional and com-
petency crisis and as discussed above, selected issues are neither comprehen-
sive nor ultimate answers for questions which will arise. Seemingly, another 
57 See N. Baber, T. Hickman, J. King, op.cit.
58 See P. Craig, Brexit..., p. 37; V. Miller, A. Lang, op.cit., p. 17; Brexit and..., p. 7 ff.
59 See Brexit and..., pp. 20–21.
60 See P. Craig, Brexit..., pp. 38–40.
61 See e.g. A.W. Bradley, K.D. Ewing, Constitutional..., pp. 309–310.
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constitutional issue is stemming from the pre-withdrawal legality discussion, 
which relates to the process of devolution62, since the EU law has a serious im-
pact on local government legislation and the scope of their competencies63. 
Several questions of law can be posed, firstly, whether British constitutional 
law requires approval to be given by devolved legislatures on triggering Art. 
50 (stage no. 1–2)64. Secondly, whether devolved legislation on ‘Brexit’ would 
be binding for the government. Thirdly, since the broad spectrum of EU-law 
matters filled with devolved competencies65 what is the optimal way after with-
drawal to divide regained powers between Westminster, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland66? Nonetheless a post-treaty stage is needed for further con-
sideration on whether there is a necessity to hold another referendum on the 
final ‘Brexit’ agreement67.
The essential factor which must be solved is the recognition of British ‘con-
stitutional requirements’. In other words, judiciary is the last hope for over-
coming the uncertainty under constitutional law. Only one fact is certain at 
this point that there is a strong argumentation in favor of Parliament’s com-
petencies over all stages of ‘Brexit’. This is to say Westminster’s approval is 
needed under Art. 50 and one could say that the merits of such an act of Par-
liament will also affect the negotiations between the UK’s government and 
the EU-27. Furthermore, Parliament’s approval is needed for the ‘Brexit’ deal 
ratification, meaning that Westminster, in terms of scrutiny, would determine 
whether the new treaty is beneficial for UK. In a post-treaty reality, the Par-
liament is obligated to guarantee proper rights for UK citizens, market par-
62 About devolution process see e.g. B.H. Toszek, E. Kużelewska, Od wizji do rzeczywistości. 
Dziesięć lat dewolucji w Walii, Warszawa 2011, pp. 13 ff.
63 See P. Leyland, The Constitution..., pp. 267–268; V. Miller, A. Lang, Brexit..., pp. 9, 37–38.
64 See decision of High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland McCord’s (Raymond) Application 
NIQB 85; J. Hunt, op.cit; Gina Miller & Deir Tozetti Dos Santos v. Secretary of State [103]-[104].
65 See e.g. S. Douglas-Scott, Removing references to EU law from the devolution legislation would 
require the consent of the devolved assemblies, “The Constitution Unit” (13 June 2016), https://
constitution-unit.com/2016/06/13/removing-references-to-eu-law-from-the-devolution-leg-
islation-would-invoke-the-sewel-convention/(12.12.2016).
66 Scotland and Wales’ s governments will intervene in hearings before Supreme Court 
scheduled for December; see UK Supreme Court allows Scotland and Wales to enter Brexit lawsuit, 
“Jurist” (19 November 2016), http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2016/11/uk-supreme-court-
allows-scotland-and-wales-to-enter-brexit-lawsuit.php (12.12.2016).
67 See D. Chalmers, Article 50...
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ticipants and other relevant areas previously governed by EU law. This is es-
pecially the case due to abovementioned issues between Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland.
One might say that this paper is speculative and purely theoretical, yet 
this is not the case. Because daily new issues connected with the UK’s mem-
bership in the EU are occurring the academic debate is lack of certainty. One 
could not foresee what the decision of the Supreme Courts will be neither it 
is possible to determine the scope and merits of future negotiations or deals 
between the UK and the EU-27. In Summary, the role of the academic com-
munity is to list the potential problems without any proper answers.
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